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Litigating Lead-Based Paint Hazards: Is It a Solution? 





Despite dramatic declines in American children’s blood lead levels and in the 
numbers of homes with lead-based paint, courts are busy with costly and lengthy 
litigation over lead-based paint hazards. Most litigation takes the form of suits by tenants 
against landlords,
1 but state and local authorities have filed an unusual set of suits against 
paint manufacturers.  These authorities are seeking to recover expenses they believe they 
have incurred as a result of high lead levels among local residents.  Even the federal 
government may get involved.  Two Northeast Senators are planning to reintroduce a 
1999 bill that would authorize the federal government to sue manufacturers of lead or 
lead compounds for lead-related housing, education and medical costs.
2   
Lawsuits against the paint manufacturers might seem an unlikely policy 
development because the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission banned the sale 
of lead-based paint nationally in 1978, and some localities imposed similar bans much 
earlier.  But lead, which as a metal does not biodegrade, can still pose hazards in older 
homes where it is present.  In addition, large corporations with deep pockets, including 
BP Amoco, have acquired some of the companies that used to sell lead-based paint.   
Should more government agencies join the lawsuits against former lead-based 
paint manufacturers? Is such litigation likely to solve problems associated with lead-
based paint? Although we cannot offer a definitive assessment because these suits are 
new and ongoing, we analyze the social problems related to lead-based paint hazards and 
consider whether government-sponsored civil litigation is likely to solve them.  We also 
review lawsuits against landlords, and we analyze the incentives such rulings give 
landlords to control lead-based paint hazards.
3   
We show that lawsuits against paint companies are a poor solution to social 
problems related to lead-based paint.  They may provide increased funding, but only part 
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of any winnings would go to children who have been harmed or to control lead-based 
paint hazards in residences.  Lawsuits are unlikely to result in fair compensation because, 
if successful, they cause parties only indirectly responsible for the harm to make 
payments to other parties who have been only indirectly harmed. In addition, these suits 
provide no useful deterrent value; indeed, the only possible deterrent effect is to reduce 
incentives to make products that in the future might be shown to have adverse health 
effects.  Such suits appear not to promote accountability among potential wrongdoers 
because they hold people accountable for past actions on the basis of new and improved 
scientific understanding.  We also show that suits against landlords yield awards that are 
not very sensitive to the level of damages and payments to plaintiffs that are very large 
relative to the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) estimates of damages.  Finally, 
we assess landlords’ incentives to control lead-based paint hazards in light of current 
regulations and recent court cases.   
In the next section we give a fairly extensive overview of lead-based paint 
hazards, because an understanding of the nature of the effects of lead on health, current 
regulation, and existing incentives to control lead hazards is essential to an evaluation of 
the newly announced lawsuits.  In the following section we turn to lead litigation and 
discuss the government sponsored suits as well as the experience of tenant-landlord suits.  
Finally we turn to discussions and conclusions.  
 
 
Overview of lead-based paint hazards 
 
  Lead-related litigation occurs despite government regulation of lead-based paint 
hazards because of the risks such hazards pose to young children.  In this section we 
review the public health implications of lead, the existing regulations, and the economic 
incentives that landlords currently face to remedy these hazards.  
 
  Effects on Public Health  
 
In young children—the most vulnerable population—lead has been linked to 
impairment of intelligence, small-muscle control, hearing, and emotional development 
even at low levels where obvious symptoms are not present. At higher levels of  
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contamination now rare among U.S. children, lead causes increasingly severe health 
effects including death.  We present in table 1 a list of the health effects and the medical 
recommendations associated with different levels of lead contamination.
4 At low levels 
children’s blood lead levels correlate with their IQ scores. In general, an increase in 
children’s blood lead levels of 1 microgram per deciliter (µg/dl) is associated with a 
decline of about 0.26 IQ points.
5  The IQ deficit in the vast majority of children exposed 
to lead hazards is less than 2 IQ points.
6  
Blood lead levels in children have fallen dramatically in the past twenty years 
because of federal bans on lead in gasoline and paint and controls on lead in drinking 
water and consumer products;
7 see figures 1a and 1b.  Between 1991 and 1994, fewer 
than 5 percent of young children between ages 1 to 5 years (about 930,000 children) had 
blood lead levels greater than or equal to 10 µg/dl, a level of concern established by the 
Centers for Disease Control.  About 0.4 percent of children between ages 1 to 5 years 
(some 85,000 children) had blood lead levels at or above 20 µg/dl.
8  The reductions from 
earlier levels reflect a remarkable public health success.  
More recent but less representative data from 19 states’ surveillance programs 
confirm this trend.
9  From 1994 to 1999, the geometric mean blood lead level in children 
aged 1 to 5 years in these states decreased from 2.7 µg/dl to 2.0 µg/dl, and the 50th 
percentile decreased from 2.6 µg/dl to 1.9 µg/dl.  In the 19 states providing data, the 
proportion of children tested with blood lead levels at or above 10 µg/dl decreased from 
10.5 percent in 1996 to 7.6 percent in 1998. The proportions of children with blood lead 
levels above 15 µg/dl and above 20 µg/dl also decreased.  These continued reductions 
underscore the success of more recent efforts to reduce children’s lead levels.  
One rarely appreciated reason for these sharp reductions in blood lead levels is the 
rapid drop in the number of lead-contaminated homes.  Ten years ago, approximately 64 
million housing units had lead-based paint.  The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) recently reported that an estimated 38 million homes in the United 
States have lead-based paint somewhere in the building.
10  Thus, over the last ten years 
there has been a dramatic reduction in the scope of the problem.   
Despite those improvements, African-American children between 1 and 5 years of 
age and children of low-income, urban families are still at greater than average risk. For  
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non-Hispanic black children 1 to 5 years of age, the mean blood lead level in 1994 was 
4.3 µg/dl, significantly above the mean value of 2.3 µg/dl for non-Hispanic white 
children.
11 The likelihood that any child between 1 and 5 years of age has blood lead 
levels in excess of 10 µg/dl was four times greater if the child is from a low-income, 
rather than a middle-income, family.
12  The most recent data also show that the problem 
remains concentrated on a local level.  Older and poorer communities are most affected. 
 
Existing Regulations  
Concern for children with high blood lead levels has already resulted in 
significant federal regulation of lead hazards in housing. Owners are required to disclose 
any information about the presence of lead-based paint or lead hazards to prospective 
buyers or renters.
13 Professional lead-contractors must also keep records of any work and 
provide copies to owners.
14  Only government-certified workers may inspect homes and 
abate residential lead hazards.
15  Finally, owners of homes built before 1978 must provide 
a federally approved lead-hazard information pamphlet to prospective buyers or renters.
16   
Motivated by continuing concern for children’s health, EPA in January 2001 
issued uniform, numerical hazard standards for lead-based paint, dust-lead and lead in 
soil.
17 The standards—which are significantly more stringent than both pre-existing 
guidelines and EPA’s 1997 proposal—would apply to most pre-1978 housing, as well as 
to other facilities occupied by children.
18  They define a lead-based paint hazard to 
include “Any other deteriorated lead-based paint in any residential building or child-
occupied facility or on the exterior of any residential building or child-occupied facility 
[emphasis added].”
19  As a result, EPA acknowledges that “almost all” older homes 
where lead-based paint is present are out of compliance.
20   EPA set such a stringent 
standard “to alert the public to the fact that all deteriorated lead-based paint should be 
addressed—through use of paint stabilization or interim controls.”
21 In addition, the rule 
designates hazardous levels of lead in dust and soil and specified clearance levels that 
correspond to these hazard standards; cleanup is incomplete if these levels are not met.
22  
  This rule is unusual in that EPA expects it to be enforced by third parties, 
including litigants and the courts.  The authorizing statute makes no provision for EPA to 
take enforcement action, and EPA states that the rule does not, by itself, mandate any  
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particular action.
23  EPA believes “…  it is likely that an indirect legal enforcement 
mechanism will develop through the threat of legal liability.”
24 EPA adds that “... these 
standards will become part of Federal mortgage programs administered through 
HUD...Furthermore, mortgage lenders are likely to be more hesitant to fund property 
acquisitions if those properties exceed the standards.”
25  Elsewhere EPA “…expects that 
public and private institutions may incorporate the standards into State and local laws, 
housing codes, and lending and insurance standards.”
26   If EPA’s expectations are 
realized, rental housing may be in substantial compliance with the rule within a few 
years.   
  Economic analysis played an important role in the development of EPA’s rule.  
The agency used benefit-cost analysis to identify a range of standards from which to 
choose final standards.  It selected its final standards “based on consideration of relevant 
factors, including the assumptions and tools underlying EPA’s analysis, health 
protectiveness, cost and the effect on the overall lead risk reduction program.”
27   
EPA’s rulemaking suffers from serious flaws related to its economic analysis.  
First, the analysis considers standards that do not correspond with the standards that EPA 
adopted in its final rule.  EPA’s analysis assumes that deteriorated lead-based paint of 
less than 2 square feet per room is not a hazard, while the rule defines as a hazard “any” 
deteriorated lead-based paint.  Thus, the rule covers many homes with lower-risk than 
those included in EPA’s economic analysis, and as a result the net benefits are likely to 
be much less.  Second, it does not refer to a recent HUD housing survey that indicates 
very large reductions in the number of lead contaminated homes in the interval 1990 to 
1998-1999.
28  
  EPA’s estimates of the net benefits of complying with its standards (between 
negative $20 billion and positive $54 billion) are likely to be too high because EPA 
assumes that the birth of a child is the event that triggers intervention activities.  The 
standards themselves, however, apply to all housing that may be occupied by young 
children.
29  For its proposed rule, EPA estimated that net benefits assuming that real 
estate transactions rather than births triggered abatement activity.  In this case its 
estimates of the net benefits of the proposed rule, which is less stringent than the final  
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rule, were negative $55 billion using one risk assessment model and negative $6.3 billion 
using another.   
EPA’s lead hazard standards are incorporated in a HUD rule that housing 
receiving federal assistance and federally-owned housing that is to be sold may not pose 
lead-based paint hazards to young children.
 30  The rule sets requirements for remediation 
based on the amount of federal funding received by property-owners.  The most stringent 
level of protection required (full abatement of lead-based paint) applies to public housing 
and multifamily mortgage insurance for conversions and major rehabilitations.  In 
contrast, HUD-owned single-family properties and multifamily properties receiving 
rental assistance require only paint stabilization.
31  The rule also directs HUD to inspect 
and provide rehabilitation assistance based on the amount of federal support received by 
the property-owner.
32 
  In addition to these federal regulations, various local and state laws and 
regulations also address residential lead hazards, but we provide only a brief summary 
because these vary so much across jurisdictions and over time. The National Conference 
of State Legislatures lists thirty-four states with more than fifteen combinations of dust 
and soil standards that differ from EPA’s recently issued standards.
33   
The structure of states’ programs varies widely.  New York’s state law focuses on 
screening and notification.
34  Massachusetts requires the owner of a residential premise to 
remove or cover lead-based materials so as to make them inaccessible to children
35 and 
has a policy of strict liability that may hold property owners accountable for damages to 
children who are poisoned in their rental properties.
36  Rhode Island law has no such 
requirement or similar liability policy; instead, it makes ‘lead free’ or ‘lead safe’ 
certification a condition to licensing facilities such as schools and nurseries and requires 
tenant notification of lead hazards.
37  Last year Virginia enacted a law providing some 
immunity to landlords and owners, provided that they notify tenants or purchasers of lead 
hazards and comply with Virginia’s lead-paint laws, the Uniform Statewide Building 
Code, “and applicable federal laws and regulations.”
38   
  Maryland has a unique lead control program.  The state Lead Paint Poisoning Act, 
enacted in 1994, is designed to bypass the tort liability system and provide a remedial 
assistance program to lessen children’s lead exposure while also giving limited liability to  
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owners who comply with certain risk-reduction standards.
39  Property owners pay a 
nominal annual registration fee and get an inspection certificate if they perform a ‘risk 
reduction’ consisting of basic maintenance procedures at turnover.  If a child at the 
property is later found to have an elevated blood lead level, the property owner can make 
a ‘qualified offer’ which, if accepted, provides up to $9,500 in relocation benefits until 
the child is six and up to $7,500 in medical benefits, if not otherwise covered by 
insurance.  By accepting a qualified offer, a child waives the right to sue.  Maryland law 
also ensures that property owners can be insured for the amount of the qualified offer, if 
they participate in this plan—a notable benefit, because insurance coverage for lead 
hazards can be uncertain.  The Coalition to End Childhood Lead Poisoning, which 
manages this program for Maryland, reports that 63 offers have been made since 1996.  
Of these, 44 offers have been accepted.  This apparently low rate of participation may be 
partly be explained by the fact that, of children with blood lead levels above the 
minimum level of 20 :g/dl necessary for eligibility, only about 15 percent live in eligible 
housing.  Very few landlords are participating in the program, despite its advantages.
40 
Local laws change over time.  New York City’s Local Law 38, signed into law in 
July 1999, replaced Local Law 1, which had been in force since 1982 and had required 
removal of lead paint from children’s dwellings. On October 11, 2000, a state court judge 
struck down Local Law 38, making Local Law 1 again the applicable law.
41  Changes in 
the interpretation of local laws by the courts make it even more difficult to generalize 
about the nature of local regulation of residential lead hazards.
42   
Finally, enforcement (or the lack thereof) may result in great differences in the 
effective stringency of laws and regulations.  In fact, questions of enforcement drove the 
enactment of New York’s Local Law 38 in 1999.  In 1985, a group of petitioners brought 
an action to compel the city to enforce Local Law 1.
43  During the fifteen years before the 
repeal of Local Law 1, the city was held in contempt of court multiple times for not 
promulgating regulations required by the law.
44   
These different state policies may affect blood lead levels.  In a comparison of 
children’s lead poisoning in Providence, Rhode Island and Worcester, Massachusetts, 
Sargent and colleagues suggest that active enforcement of Massachusetts’ more stringent 
policies has lowered the prevalence of high blood lead levels more than in neighboring  
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Providence. The percentage of children with blood lead levels above 10 :g/dl was twice 
as high in Providence as in Worcester.  The percentage of children with blood lead levels 
above 20 :g/dl was three and a half times higher in Providence than in Worcester.   
Although both states have laws mandating universal annual lead screening of children 
aged 6 to 60 months, lead hazard management and landlord liability vary greatly, and 
Massachusetts requires abatement of any lead hazard in homes built before 1978 in which 
children younger than 6 years live.
45   
Regulatory authorities have chosen to emphasize the preemptive avoidance of 
exposures that could raise children’s blood lead. While that approach has the clear benefit 
of prevention, it requires control of hazards in large numbers of homes. If abatement is to 
reduce risks of elevated blood lead before it occurs, hazards must be controlled at homes 
where children do not have elevated blood lead levels. Indeed, attainment of EPA’s 
stringent paint standard would require abatement of “almost all” homes built before 1978.  
Of course regulators’ preference for primary prevention is at odds with their reluctance to 
embark on enforcement of mandatory standards in the millions of homes with lead-base 
paint.  New York City relaxed its mandatory controls because it found them too stringent.   
Despite the general emphasis on primary prevention of lead poisoning, it is worth 
mentioning the failure of existing efforts to identify and treat high-blood lead children.  
The federal Health Care Financing Administration requires that all Medicaid-eligible 
children ages one through five be tested.  Enforcement of this screening requirement has 
historically been very inadequate according to the congressional Government Accounting 
Office,
46 and lawsuits have been brought in St. Louis, Idaho and Ohio.
47  
 
The Economics of Controlling Lead 
The economics of controlling lead-based paint hazards are different from those of 
other environmental risks because the primary problem occurs within a home. Almost all 
lead-related health hazards involve a landlord and a tenant or a homeowner’s own family.   
Thus, safety from lead-based paint threats is not a public good, nor does it involve a 
classic externality like air or water pollution.  Of course a complicating factor is that 
assessment of lead-based paint hazards is costly and health effects in most affected 
children are asymptomatic, so that property owners and residents may be making  
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decisions under substantial uncertainty.  Despite these complications, Coasian solutions 
seem applicable provided that property rights are well defined. 
A key issue is the incentives that property owners and landlords have to control 
lead-based paint hazards, because the available controls are at the discretion of the 
property owner or landlord.  These controls include wet-mopping, use of special vacuum 
cleaners, encapsulating contaminated walls or parts of doors or windows, and replacing 
or covering contaminated soil.  Stripping or removing surfaces where lead-based paint is 
accessible or subject to friction is especially helpful.  Of course, parents also have a role, 
but educational efforts aimed at parents are not very effective.
48  
Here we focus on landlords, because owner-occupied housing—with costs and 
benefits of controls internal to each family—seems a poor target for regulatory efforts.  
Moreover, recent federal disclosure regulations already address potential problems of 
asymmetric information about lead hazards in owner-occupied housing markets.   
A self-interested landlord would generally control lead-paint hazards to the point 
where the incremental costs of further controls equal the incremental benefits. The 
incremental costs include the costs of the contractors who inspect for lead hazards and 
control them.  The incremental benefits involve potential increases in rent, in resale value 
and in the reduced risk of uninsured litigation costs and any reductions in insurance 
premiums.
49  Therefore from the landlord’s perspective, efficient resource allocation 
dictates that the marginal increase in rent plus the additional appreciation in the value of 
the property, and any savings in insurance premiums, less the reduction in expected 
uninsured payments to plaintiffs equals the marginal cost of controlling lead hazards.   
EPA has presented reasonably complete data on the marginal cost of controlling 
residential lead hazards, so the incremental benefits to landlords may be the key to a full 
understanding of the incentives to control lead-based paint hazards.
50  The effect of lead 
hazards on the price of renting or buying real estate is a crucial determinant of likely 
clean-up levels, but these effects appear small at best. We have not found a single study 
indicating that the presence of lead-based paint or lead-based paint hazards affects 
housing prices. Indeed anecdotal evidence suggests that lead hazards may affect housing 
prices hardly at all.
51    
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Real-estate appraisers adjust appraisals for suspected lead hazards in only a 
limited way.  Guidelines by the Federal Housing Authority and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development state that “if the property was built before 1978, and 
there is evidence of cracking, chipping, peeling or loose paint, [the appraiser must] make 
this statement on lead-based paint: ‘Property built before 1978, lead-based paint 
corrective measures are required.’”
52  For condominium units built before 1978 that show 
signs of “excessive deferred maintenance of defective paint” appraisers should prepare 
estimates assuming that satisfactory repairs are completed.  Thus, the guidelines to date 
do not require an assessment of the scope of the problem.  For example, they do not 
require an assessment of lead in dust, although such lead-contaminated dust may be 
present if there is deteriorated lead-based paint. In general they assume that lead hazards 
can be controlled through conventional repairs rather than special measures.  
Although insurers may adjust premiums for general commercial liability 
insurance according to whether buildings are known to be lead-safe, it is unclear whether 
these adjustments are significant.
53  In addition, reductions in expected uninsured 
litigation costs are also likely to be of limited value, because the risk of incurring such 
costs appears small.  Less than a hundred awards to lead-poisoned children are reported 
each year, although tens of thousands of children have blood lead levels above 20 µg/dl.  
In addition, insurance may cover many landlords’ liability, although many liability 
policies exclude pollution-related claims from covered claims and insurers have gone to 
court to avoid having to pay damages to tenants.  Currently there is substantial legal 
uncertainty about whether lead-based paint hazards are covered by policies that have 
conventional pollutant exclusion clauses.  The issue is still being debated:  Mealey's has 
reported that lead was construed to be a pollutant in a Florida case, but the pollution 
exemption clause was found inapplicable to lead in Pennsylvania.
54  
Thus, one reason that success stories about controlling lead hazards involve only 
hundreds or thousands of residences, while many millions have lead-based paint hazards, 
is that there are weak incentives for landlords to pay for such controls.
55   
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Lead Litigation  
 
  A variety of lawsuits concerning lead-based paint hazards have been filed in 
recent years.  The most common lawsuit involves a child with high blood lead who sues a 
landlord.  We develop a quantitative analysis of the outcomes of such suits in a later 
section.  Some other recent suits involve an alleged poisoning of a babysitter’s children 
by renovation at her employer’s home, a child who ate a lead-based sealer used by a 
utility company’s employee, and a lawsuit over product liability for a heat-gun used in 
renovation.  One filing is a class action lawsuit on behalf of owners of older homes 
against former lead-based paint manufacturers. From the perspective of government 
policy, however, the most interesting filings involve suits by government bodies against 
companies that sold lead-based paint.   While these suits are growing in number, not one 
has won money for the plaintiffs. 
In table 2 we summarize ongoing lawsuits by various state and local government 
authorities against former lead-based paint companies.  Plaintiffs include the Rhode 
Island Attorney General, a group of California counties in the San Francisco Bay area, 
two Houston school districts, counties in Texas and Mississippi, and the cities of New 
York, Saint Louis, and Milwaukee; Chicago is expected to file a suit soon.  In addition, 
Peter Angelos, a key attorney in the tobacco litigation, is bringing two suits, one a class-
action suit on behalf of Maryland homeowners and one on behalf of five lead-poisoned 
children.  In addition to these ongoing suits, approximately forty cases against various 
representatives of the lead paint industry have been dismissed in the past.
56   
The suits involving government plaintiffs raise a variety of new questions about 
the proper exercise of government authority.   Other authors have noted several concerns 
with such suits.
57 These lawsuits can transfer substantial sums from industry to 
governments and may in that sense rival traditional government authorities to tax or 
regulate the private sector.  They sidestep established constitutional processes for elected 
representatives to determine policy.  Finally, it is unclear that they are efficient as a 
compensatory mechanism because large sums go to lawyers.  
  In discussing these lead-related suits, we start with three accepted purposes of 
civil litigation: compensation, deterrence and accountability.
58  Compensation can  
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include reimbursement of expenses such as those for medical treatment, as well as 
payments to cover pain and suffering.  Compensation is accepted as a purpose of civil 
litigation because of a broadly held belief that it is fair that parties who wrongly harm 
others offer compensation for that harm.  Deterrence is an important goal to the extent 
that certain hazards are ongoing and put people at continued risk. Civil suits can deter 
paint-companies or landlords from future wrongdoing.  Finally, by establishing rules to 
assess liability, the tort system provides a mechanism for society to hold wrongdoers 
accountable for their actions.  For example, civil suits may lead to the assessment of 
punitive damages for particularly egregious behavior if the jury finds the defender 
liable.
59   
The social problems associated with lead-based paint seem particularly poorly 
suited for court-ordered remedies, at least in terms of these three purposes of litigation.  If 
mandatory compensation is to be fair, a party directly responsible for harm must pay it to 
someone who suffered from the harm.  Yet the lawsuits in question involve parties only 
indirectly associated with the threats to health posed by lead-based paint.  Shareholders in 
modern corporations have no responsibility for the historical decisions to make and sell 
lead-based paint a half-century ago, yet the suits put them at risk of having to pay 
compensation.  Moreover, the companies are often sued under a theory that their liability 
can be determined on the basis of national or regional market share over a period of 
decades, rather than on the basis of any physical evidence linking lead-base paint hazards 
to a particular brand of paint known to be sold by a specific company.  Finally, the 
quality of home maintenance is a crucial factor in determining the extent of lead-based 
paint hazard.  Well-to-do neighborhoods generally have fewer lead-based paint hazards 
because superior maintenance has resulted in less deterioration of the existing lead-based 
paint and thus lower lead levels. 
The government entities engaging in the suits also are not the parties directly 
harmed by lead-based paint.  Lead hurts the children who ingest it and the families of 
those children. It only indirectly affects the school districts that serve the children and the 
medical institutions that may treat them. These suits thus break new ground in seeking 
compensation for parties harmed only indirectly.  Moreover, these suits often seek money 
to abate lead hazard problems in existing housing rather than to compensate people who  
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may have had high blood lead as a result of the lead hazards.
60  While this approach 
protects young children born in the future, it offers no compensation for people unlucky 
enough to be born in, say, the 1990s instead of a decade later. In a sense, such a suit 
would benefit landlords more than children. 
    In the case of possible federal lawsuits against former lead-based paint 
manufacturers, the new government revenues would not necessarily go to the people who 
were harmed as children or even to reduce childhood lead poisoning.  The Senate bill 
soon to be reintroduced makes the use of funds subject to requirements of the 
appropriations process.  Thus, winnings from federal suits against lead companies might 
well go to pork barrel projects.  
Local governments that are filing the suits have always had opportunities to 
protect themselves from these indirect costs without contracting with trial lawyers.  Some 
local governments have adopted legislation or regulations, such as New York City’s 1960 
ban on lead-based paint for residential uses.
61  They can also impose taxes or fees such as 
California’s unique tax on gasoline and paint companies.  These fees generate about $12 
million dollars each year for risk-communication, screening, and treatment.
62  Thus, local 
governments’ lawsuits re substitutes for earlier action they might have taken. 
A financial incentive is apparent in the contingency fees that municipalities and 
other local government bodies have accepted.  These fees are significant.  As shown in 
table 2, the first suits have been rapidly copied in other jurisdictions because they pose 
little financial risks to the local governments while offering a promise of big winnings.
63  
The contingency financing raises an interesting policy question.  I f  s t a t e s  o r  
localities have ‘nothing to lose’, why not sue?  The lawyers handling the Houston cases 
used this convincing argument as their first point in a letter addressed to the Region 11 
Education Center, describing the opportunity to sue as “A win-win situation.  The district 
has nothing to lose in adopting the proposed resolution to file suit.  If we recover nothing 
for a district, the district will owe no attorney fees or costs.”
64   
Broadly speaking, the primary rationale for government agencies to sue these 
companies appears reminiscent of Willie Horton’s famous rejoinder about why he robbed 
banks: that’s where the money is.    
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The second key purpose of civil litigation is deterrence, but the suits against 
former lead paint companies have no beneficial deterrent value whatsoever.  Federal 
regulations have prohibited paint companies from selling lead-based paint for 23 years; in 
some localities restrictions have been in place for much longer.  The lead lawsuits 
provide no deterrent value to paint companies because they are not now engaged in any 
lead-related behavior that is potentially harmful to public health. 
Yet the lead lawsuits may have much broader unintended effects on firms that 
produce and market goods.  Holding firms liable for past actions on the basis of new 
scientific information may provide sweeping incentives to alter product design, 
production levels, or marketing practices.  Any product may in the future be found to be 
less safe than current information indicates.  Thus, all manufacturing firms may interpret 
suits against former lead-based paint manufacturers as implying that they face unknown 
future liabilities associated with any new evidence of health risks attributable to the 
current product line.  In this sense the deterrent value of these class action suits is 
chilling.   
In the case of lead there is surely new information about the risks to health.  New 
scientific investigations have dramatically changed the definition of what childhood 
exposure to lead is considered safe.  In 1970, the Surgeon General defined ‘undue 
exposure’ to lead as greater than 40 µg/dl, although this level was considered 
asymptomatic at the time and was intended to give an adequate margin of safety to 
remove the affected child from the source of exposure.
65  The federal Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) set a level of concern at 30 µg/dl in 1980 and then five years later lowered 
its level to 25 µg/dl.
66  In 1991, the CDC again lowered its level of concern to 10 µg/dl.
67  
Thus, there has been a four-fold decline in levels of children’s blood lead that the 
scientific community and public health authorities perceived to be safe.  If lead-based 
paint contributes to elevated in blood lead levels in a systematic way, as is implicit in the 
risk assessment models that EPA uses for its regulatory decisions, then reductions in the 
levels of lead in blood that are considered safe imply reductions in safe levels of lead in 
paint.   Thus a finding that lead-based paint firms are liable amounts to holding them 
responsible for past actions on the basis of current information.  The most plausible  
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incentive effects of such a policy would be to deter the sale of products and the 
acquisition of plant and equipment generally.   
A third purpose of civil litigation is to ensure that people are held accountable for 
their negligent misdeeds. Yet for several reasons, litigation against lead-based paint 
companies does not promote accountability.   First, they are being sued for production 
and marketing decisions that they made with the approval of regulators forty to eighty 
years ago.  Regulatory authorities whose official function was to promote public health 
and to protect public safety had some responsibility during their time in office.  If they 
failed to use that responsibility does it all then shift to the lead-paint companies? The 
defense of compliance with existing regulations should carry some weight.  Lawsuits by 
municipalities that failed to use their authority to regulate lead-based paint earlier than 
the federal government in particular seem opportunistic. 
Second, the suits promote a Kafkaesque accountability to the extent that lead 
companies are being held liable for risks uncovered by scientific investigations 
completed after lead-based paint was sold.  Irrespective of what lead-based paint 
manufacturers once knew, it is indisputable that scientific understanding about the risks 
of exposure to lead has substantially improved since 1970.  In the face of such improved 
understanding, the accountability that the lawsuits appear to promote is akin to changing 
the rules of the game after the kickoff.  
Finally, these lawsuits represent an abrupt departure from the cooperative 
approach to environmental problem solving used in the regulatory negotiations of the 
early 1990s.
68  EPA organized such negotiations for important rulemakings to address 
problems like combined sewer overflows and disinfection byproducts in drinking water.
69  
For these rulemakings the agency invited "stakeholders" to a series of public meetings to 
seek consensus on a specific regulatory option that EPA could then use as the basis for a 
regulation.  Such regulatory negotiations and the difficulty of achieving consensus often 
delayed the promulgation of a final rule.  Yet many observers believed that this process 
was an improvement over the conventional one because it could reduce the delays, costs 
and uncertainty associated with legal challenges to final rules.  In addition, regardless of 
the difficulties of implementing regulatory negotiations, sponsors of such negotiations 
and the participants themselves shared a belief that a voluntary consensus seemed  
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intrinsically valuable.  They preferred a negotiated consensus to the adversarial litigation 
that dogged so many environmental regulations.  
Suits against former lead-based paint manufacturers, by either private or 
government plaintiffs, fail to meet the conventional purposes of civil litigation.  In 
addition they mark a sharp departure from the consensual policy development processes 
popular in the 1990s.     
  
Tenant-landlord suits 
It is useful to compare lawsuits against landlords with lawsuits against former 
lead-based paint manufacturers.  Landlords and their insurance companies have paid 
awards in the millions of dollars to hundreds of children suffering from high blood lead 
levels.  These payments, unlike those that might result from suits against former paint 
companies, are from the party responsible for the harm to the party that suffered the 
harm.  The risk of losing such cases provides an incentive to landlords to control lead-
based paint hazards on their properties.  And such suits hold landlords accountable for 
hazardous conditions on their premises.  Here we look more closely at lawsuits against 
landlords to assess the deterrent effects of such suits.   
We collected data on outcomes of lawsuits against landlords from the legal 
professional press.  Most of the cases were reported in the Verdict & Settlement Report, 
Exclusive Edition of Mealey’s Litigation Report: Lead.  This volume covers verdicts 
from September 1990 to September 1999 and settlements from January 1998 to 
September 1999.  We also collected more recent data from weekly publications of 
Mealey’s Litigation Report: Lead through March 7, 2001.   
Mealey’s summarizes litigation results reported by attorneys or in court filings. 
The reports typically mention the amount of any award, blood lead levels, whether the 
award was a settlement or court-ordered.  They often mention whether juries decided the 
awards.  Juries determined about forty percent of the cases, while another forty percent 
reflected settlements.   
  These data suggest growth and decline in the number of children on whose behalf 
suits were pursued to conclusion in the nineties.
70  In the first three full years for which 
Mealey’s reported lawsuits (1992-1994), it reported 29 cases.  For the period 1995 to  
  17 
 
1997, it reported 74 cases and for the years 1998 to 2000, it reported only 51 cases.  
Mealey’s also reported settlements systematically for the most recent years and these 
added substantially to the total number of cases.  Mealey’s reported 92 settlements for the 
three years 1998 to 2000.  It is intriguing that lawsuits have not fallen with declines in 
blood lead levels and in contaminated housing, but changes in the annual number of 
reported cases may be due in part to changes in Mealey’s data collection methods.   
  Using these data we explore questions relating to the amount of an award given 
that one exists and to the probability of any award going to the plaintiff.  We consider 
whether the awards are commensurate with the damage estimates implied by EPA and 
HUD models.  Blood lead levels are generally a very good measure of damages, insofar 
as epidemiological evidence links blood lead levels in children to measures of 
neurological performance, such as IQ, and to other health effects.  As shown in table 1, 
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry categorizes the severity of lead-
related health effects according to the blood lead levels of children.  EPA and HUD use 
blood lead levels as the measure of exposure to lead and hence lead-related health effects 
in their assessments of the benefits of controlling environmental lead.   
The data suggest that the awards are generous relative to the value that federal 
agencies put on reducing blood lead levels.  EPA has estimated that an increase in blood 
lead levels of 10 µg/dl lowers IQ by about 2.6 points and that each IQ point lost lowers 
the present value of discounted life-time earnings by about $9,500.
71  Thus, at least for 
changes in low levels of blood lead below 20 or 25 µg/dl, an increase in blood lead of 10 
µg/dl would be associated with reductions in the present value of lifetime earnings of 
about $25,000.  By contrast, the average award paid to children with blood lead levels 
more than 10 µg/dl and less than or equal to 20 µg/dl was $524,000 in 2000 dollars, and 
the median award to children with this level of lead in their blood was $81,000.  Awards 
to children with blood lead levels greater than 20 µg/dl but less than or equal to 30 µg/dl 
averaged $929,000; the median award to such children was about $187,000.   Both the 
mean and median values are much larger than estimates implied by the economic models 
used by HUD and EPA.   
Of course such large awards might make sense if they were partly punitive.  In 
instances where negligence is hard to detect and proof of causality is rare, significant  
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punitive awards may make economic sense.
72 Unfortunately, we do not know what part 
of the awards was punitive because Mealey’s provides virtually no information about 
punitive damages.  
We begin our regressions with a Box-Cox procedure to choose an appropriate 
functional form. (See table 3 for a description of the data used in the regressions.)  We 
regress the award on blood lead levels, five dummy variables for the five states with the 
most cases, and a trend variable.  For the award, the data do not reject the hypothesis of a 
logarithmic transformation, for which the true transformation parameter θ would be 0, (θ 
= 0.0170, standard error = .0281).  For the blood lead level the data do not reject an 
inverse transformation, for which the true transformation parameter λ would be -1 (λ  = 
-1.39, standard error  = .605).   We use this Box-Cox regression, which has dummy 
variables for Massachusetts, Maryland, New York and Pennsylvania and a trend variable, 
to calculate the predicted award for different levels of lead in the blood of a hypothetical 
child.
73 As shown in figure 2 the Box-Cox model implies that children with relatively 
moderate levels of lead in their blood are compensated by the judicial system more than 
suggested by EPA’s models of damages.  In addition, although the medical severity of 
higher blood lead levels increases—an increase of 20 µg/dl from a baseline of 40 µg/dl is 
worse than from a baseline of 5 µg/dl, because 25 µg/dl has essentially asymptomatic 
effects—the incremental compensation for higher blood lead levels falls sharply.  Indeed 
the awards paid to children with blood lead levels of 50 µg/dl are within 20 percent of the 
awards paid to children with blood lead levels of 100 µg/dl.  These results change little 
when we drop influential observations. 
We present in the first column of table 4 an ordinary least squares regression 
based on the Box-Cox model but with transformations of these two variables modified so 
that the estimated coefficient is (-1 times) the elasticity.
74 This regression also includes 
dummy variables for the five states with the most lawsuits (Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania) and an index for time.  It has an R
2 equal to 
0.123.  We find that the elasticity of the award with respect to the blood lead level is 0.82 
evaluated at the sample mean and that it is statistically different from zero but not from 
unity.  We also find that the awards exhibit an upward trend of about 9 percent per year.   
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Heckman (1976) and others have shown that such ordinary least squares estimates 
are biased if the error term correlates with the errors in a separate equation that 
determines whether any award is paid.  To address this selectivity bias, we present in 
model 2 estimates based on Heckman’s method, which involves simultaneously 
estimating the awards equation (with the transformations just described) and a probit 
model predicting whether any award was observed.   
Ideally, the equation estimating whether the plaintiffs receive any award should 
include as independent variables information about the likely liability of the landlord.  
Was he informed of the presence of a child on the premises and about the presence of 
specific lead-based paint hazards?  Did he fail to take timely action after receiving such 
information?  Were the hazards in question of a nature likely to have caused the observed 
blood lead levels?  We lack such data.
75  Instead, we introduce into the probit equation a 
variable for the medical significance of the blood lead level, which we take to be levels 
greater than 15 µg/dl.  We believe that only the medical significance of blood lead, and 
not levels of blood lead generally should predict whether a child receives an award.  We 
use 15 µg/dl because other measures of medical significance have less predictive value. 
We also introduce a dummy variable indicating whether any siblings were reported to 
have high blood lead levels, because we believe that the presence of siblings with high 
blood lead suggests a genuine residential hazard exists and so is likely to affect the 
probability of an award.  Finally, because we do not anticipate any trend in the likelihood 
of an award over time we introduce a set of dummy variables to model the different years 
in the sample.    
We find that these variables generally perform as expected except that the sibling 
effect is not statistically significant and that many of the year effects are also not 
statistically significant.  The elasticity of awards with respect to blood lead levels is little 
changed.  Moreover, the estimated correlation between the error terms in the two 
regressions, D, is not statistically different from zero.  Thus the selection bias appears 
small and we may as well consider the ordinary least squares regression.   
These data show that the courts award lead-poisoned children far more than 
EPA’s models of damages imply, at least for moderate levels of lead (20 :g/dl).  They 
also show rapidly diminishing incremental damages at higher blood lead levels, a finding  
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that seems at odds with the ladder of health effects summarized in table 1. A final 
implication is that the awards are fairly hard to predict. More than 85 percent of the 
variation in the (log of) awards is unexplained by the data, although blood lead levels are 
probably the single best measure of exposure and hence harm. 
While such litigation clearly provides incentives for landlords to control lead 
hazards estimating the magnitude of such incentives is difficult.  We have little 
information about the likelihood of the landlord making an uninsured payment to a child 
harmed by a lead-based paint hazard, given that such a hazard exists.  This likelihood 
may be small, however, because some 85,000 thousand young children have blood lead 
levels greater than 20 µg/dl and many hundreds of thousands of young children have 
blood lead levels higher than 10 µg/dl.  Yet each year not even a hundred lawsuits against 
landlords result in awards.  Moreover, only a fraction of children with high blood lead 
may be tenants.  Thus the risk to landlords of having to make payments is clearly small, 
on the order of one in a thousand or less.  Even if all awards were uninsured, the expected 
cost to the landlord of losing a lawsuit brought by a lead-poisoned child, given a child 
with elevated blood lead in residence, might conservatively be on the order of $500.
76  
Less conservative assumptions or liability insurance that covers lead-related claims 
would substantially lower this estimate. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Federal regulations may indirectly contribute to increased litigation.  EPA expects 
courts, lenders, insurance companies, and localities to adopt and enforce its new 
standards.  Indeed we believe that key features of the EPA standards were chosen in part 
to facilitate other institutions’ efforts to mandate them.  For example, EPA adopted a 
bright line approach, rather than acknowledging that the appropriate level of hazard 
depends in part on a variety of factors such as the number and age of children and the 
costs of remediation, that will vary from one residence to another.  These bright line 
standards may affect additional litigation if lawyers and courts are willing to interpret 
violations of these standards as evidence of negligence. But practical difficulties suggest 
limits to these effects.  The standard prohibiting “any” deteriorated lead-based paint is too 
stringent to be met. In addition, information about lead dust levels will be irrelevant in  
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court if not collected around the time that a child was identified as having high blood lead 
levels.  Thus any increases in litigation may be small.  
In the litigious world of environmental policy it is not surprising that EPA’s 
standards are themselves in doubt because of a recently announced court challenge.   The 
National Multi Housing Council and two other property-owner associations recently 
petitioned the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to review EPA’s lead 
hazard standards.  The petition asks the court to review whether the Residential Lead-
based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 authorized EPA to regulate all lead 
“regardless of the source”.  In essence, apartment owners object to being made 
responsible for cleaning up lead that is in the soil or in wind-blown dust as a result of 
historical use of leaded gasoline and does not result from leaded paint.
77  
  The lawsuits mounted by local government agencies against lead paint companies 
fail to satisfy the accepted purposes of civil litigation.  They would require parties only 
distantly responsible to pay compensation to parties who did not directly suffer harm.  
They would provide absolutely no meaningful deterrent value, while instead providing 
disincentives for manufacturing firms very generally. In addition, by seeking to hold 
paint companies liable for historical actions in light of today’s scientific understanding, 
they promote a distorted notion of accountability.   
These lawsuits are a poor way to solve the problems associated with lead-based 
paint hazards.  These suits have arisen in part because poorer, older communities where 
lead hazards are concentrated are frustrated at having insufficient resources to address 
lead hazards.  Towns like Milwaukee and St. Louis may face substantial financial 
burdens trying to comply with the new stringent hazard standards.  And in areas with low 
real estate values, lead control costs may be a significant percentage of housing values, so 
that strict enforcement of stringent new lead standards could lead to premature 
abandonment of housing.
78  But lawsuits against paint manufacturers amount to a tax on 
deep pockets whose owners have only an indirect responsibility for ills associated with 
lead-based paint.  Even if successful, they will tend to create government programs that 
will work only to the extent that children with high blood lead or homes with genuine 
lead hazards can be readily identified. Such identification is costly, as illustrated by the 
difficulties with the Medicaid-sponsored tests of children’s blood lead.  Moreover,  
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concerns over legal liability may provide landlords with incentives not to test for lead-
based paint hazards.  
  More sensible controls on lead-based paint will require better incentives for 
landlords to control hazards.  There is currently no evidence that controlling lead-based 
paint hazards increases the rents landlords can earn from rental property or the resale 
value of that property.  Thus the key reason for self-interested landlords to comply with 
EPA’s recent hazard standards may be a reduction in the risk of being sued by a tenant 
whose child has high blood lead levels.  But these risks are too low or too likely to be 
insured to provide an adequate incentive. 
  There have been proposals to provide additional funding to remediate lead-based 
paint problems.  A 1993 bill would have set up a federal trust fund for that purpose, but it 
did not make it out of committee.
79  The funds would have come from a 45 cent per 
pound tax on lead from U.S. smelters and lead in certain products entering the U.S.
80 
One alternative approach to improving incentives would be to support lead-based 
paint controls with tax incentives.  For example, the federal government could provide a 
modest tax credit for the replacement of any window frame that a certified lead inspector 
reports is lead-contaminated.  This approach would not entail large administration costs, 
and it would promote energy conservation while reducing lead hazards.  Most 
importantly, it would address the apparent lack of incentives for landlords to control lead 
hazards.  
Incentive-based proposals offer a few key advantages over the increasingly 
popular lawsuits against former lead-based paint manufacturers.  They would avoid 
burdening today’s shareholders with costs resulting from management decisions made 
decades ago.  They would avoid adverse deterrent effects on manufacturing activity.   
Most importantly, they could provide incentives for landlords to take reasonable steps to 
remediate the hazards that they control.  
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Table 1 
Effects of Lead on Health of Children and Medical Recommendations  






Health Effects   Medical Recommendation 
I  < 10   IQ, Hearing  Not considered to be lead-poisoned 
IIA  10-14  Many children (or a large proportion of 
children) with blood lead levels in this range 
should trigger community-wide childhood 
lead poisoning prevention activities. Children 









A child in Class IIB should receive nutritional 
and educational interventions and more 
frequent screening. If the blood lead levels 
persist in this range, environmental 
investigation and intervention should be done. 
III 20-44 Decreased  Vitamin  D 
metabolism, Decreased 
hemoglobin synthesis 
A child in Class III should receive 
environmental evaluation and remediation 
and a medical evaluation. Such a child may 
need pharmacologic treatment of lead 
poisoning. 
IV  45-69  Colic  A child in Class IV will need both medical 
and environmental interventions, including 
chelation therapy. 
V 70  or 
above 
Anemia, nephropathy, 
encephalopathy, death at 
around 130 :g/dl  
A child in Class V lead poisoning is a medical 
emergency. Medical and environmental 
management must begin immediately. 
 
Source: U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (1992). 
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Table 2 
Summary of Recent Litigation Against Former Lead-based Paint Manufacturers 
 
Date Filed  Plaintiff  Compensation 
Sought   Contingency financing? 




abatement at two 
projects. 
In-house 
1999  Five lead-poisoned 
children  Damages  Yes, with Peter Angelos’ 
firm. 
1999 
Class Action, Maryland 
Homeowners 
 
Abatement of all 
lead-based paint 
Yes, with Peter Angelos’ 
firm. 
1999   Rhode Island Attorney 
General  
Abatement and 





Santa Clara County, and 
other communities in the 
San Francisco Bay Area  
Abatement, 
educational, and 
public health costs, 
punitive damages 
sought in all cases. 
17% 
2000 
City of St. Louis 
 
 
Damages for treating 
lead-poisoned 
children and abating 
hazards in public 
housing 
Yes 
2000   Two Houston area school 
districts  
Costs of testing and 








based paint in 
Milwaukee homes 
Reimbursement for costs, 
20% of gross fund for first 
$20 million recovered and 
15% of additional 
2001  Harris County, Texas 
Costs of testing and 
remediation in public 
buildings 
25 % 
2001  Jefferson County, 
Mississippi 
Costs of testing and 




Note:  Chicago may be planning to file a suit for damages including future remediation 
costs and past and future costs borne by the city health department.  Financing for such a 
Chicago suit would probably occur in-house. 
Source:  Oral communications with lawyers and public relations personnel for the 
plaintiffs.   
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Table 3 
Description of Data Used in Regressions  
 
Variables   Complete Sample  Sample with Awards 
Number of children  246  210 
Mean of awards in 2001 





Mean of average blood lead 






Number of entries by 
selected state 
  
   Illinois   11  11 
   Maryland  27  21 
   Massachusetts  42  34 
   New York  127  115 
   Pennsylvania  16  13 
Number of children with a 
poisoned sibling reported   81 71 
 
 
Note: we treat siblings poisoned together as individual cases even if such children are part of a single 
lawsuit.   




Regression Results  
Coefficients and Standard Errors in () 
 














































R-Squared .123  Not  applicable 
Constraints on 
sample  
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Table 4 continued 
 
Probit Regression  
Variable Name  Estimates 
























Lambda   -.105 
(.428) 
Chi Squared value for 











Note: Rho is the correlation between the errors of the two equations, 
sigma is the standard error of the residual in the award equation and 
lambda is the product of rho and sigma.   We use 
** to denote 
coefficients that are statistically significant at a 99 percent 
confidence level and 
* to denote those significant at a 90 percent 
level.  
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 Source: Pirckle et al. (1994) And U.S. CDC (1997)  
 
New data from 19 unrepresentative states show that the proportion of children tested with 































Source: Pirckle et al. (1994) And U.S. CDC (1997)  
 
In 19 unrepresentative states, the geometric mean blood lead level in children aged 1 to 5 
years decreased from 2.7 to 2.0 µg/dl between 1991-1994 and 1999.  See CDC (2000).  
Figure 1b
Mean Blood Lead Level of Children Ages 1-5 Years (µg/dl)
NHANES III
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Note:  The predicted awards are for New York in 1998 based on the Box-Cox model described in the text. 
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 Appendix  
We collected data on outcomes of lawsuits against landlords from the legal 
professional press.  Most of our cases were reported in the Verdict & Settlement Report, 
Exclusive Edition of Mealey's Litigation Report.  This volume covers verdicts from 
September 1990 to September 1999 and settlements from January 1998 to September 
1999.  We also collected data from bi-weekly publications of Mealey's Litigation Report: 
Lead from October 29, 1999 until March 7, 2001.     
The data in Mealey's Litigation Report: Lead required editing to be suitable for 
quantitative analysis.  We excluded cases because of incomplete or inconsistent data.  We 
included cases where both an award (or dismissal) and blood lead levels were given.  For 
some children, Mealey’s provided information on the child’s gender, age, IQ, 
hospitalization history, the presence of lead-poisoned siblings, and residence time in the 
location with the alleged hazard.  These data were generally reported for only a few 
children, however.  For almost all children, Mealey’s reported whether the award was a 
settlement and, if a court-ordered award, whether handed down by a judge or jury.  We 
deleted from any analysis involving the amount of the award those cases where Mealey’s 
stated that an award amount was the simple sum of future payments rather than the cash 
value of future payments.   
Mealey’s reported only the total award for some cases involving more than one 
child.  In such instances we divided the award equally among the children, although the 
child with the higher blood lead levels may have received more of the award.   
James Corduroy, the editor of Mealey’s Litigation Report: Lead helpfully 
explained that Mealey’s obtains litigation results from attorneys, court filings, and other 
news sources.  Although unable to estimate the percentage of existing cases reported in 
Mealey’s, he believes that Mealey’s covers most.    
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